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IN RE GAGER AND THE COMMISSION TO STUDY
PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY

I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Cager,! decided in 1968, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed a Circuit Court for Prince George's County's ruling
that children living in homes with illegitimate siblings were "neglected" within the meaning of Article 26, Section 52(f) of the Maryland Code. 2 The circuit court ruling addressed three consolidated
cases concerning unwed women, each of whom gave birth to consecutive illegitimate children. 3
The court of appeals held that the circuit court misconstrued
the statute at issue in Cager. 4 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's holding that permitted the state to consider successive
illegitimate births as independently sufficient grounds for deeming
a child neglected. 5 The court also held that, in light of then-recent
Supreme Court precedent, federal requirements concerning termination of benefits eligibility under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC)6 rendered the actions taken by
Prince George's County unlawfuP Further, the court held that the
state's action was invalid because the Prince George's County State's
Attorney had wrongfully used information gleaned from AFDC applications to initiate proceedings under Section 52(f).8
1. 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968).
2. See id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f)
(1966) (repealed 1969) (defining the term "neglected child"), quoted in Gager,
251 Md. at 476 n.1, 479, 248 A.2d at 386 n.1, 388. See infra note 21 for the
text of Section 52(f).
3. See Gager, 251 Md. at 477 n.2, 501-02, 248 A.2d at 387 n.2, 400-01; see also infra
note 21 (providing text of the statute).
4. See Gager, 251 Md. at 479, 248 A.2d at 388.
5. See Gager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388.
6. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994); Gager, 251 Md. at 480,248 A.2d at 388-89
(citing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968». See infra notes 49-105 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of the Gager court's application of King arid Levy.
7. See Gager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 389.
8. See id. at 481-83, 248 A.2d at 389-90.
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This Comment will revisit the Gager decision and argue that the
case was wrongly decided for several reasons. Specifically, the statute
at issue in Gager,9 which was an outgrowth of recommendations by
the Commission to Study Problems of Illegitimacy among Recipients
of Public Welfare Monies in the Program for Aid to Dependent
Children (the Commission), unambiguously authorized the challenged actions taken by the State. 1O Furthermore, the Supreme
Court cases relied upon by the court of appeals did not support the
propositions for which they were cited. ll Additionally, the State's Attorney's reliance on information taken from AFDC applications was
consonant with the goals and structure of that program and all federal and state regulations applicable at the time. 12
This Comment concludes that the egregious misconstruction of
the authority relied on by the Gager majority invites speculation as
to whether the court's goal was to confound the clear intent of the
legislature regarding "serial illegitimacy."13 Gager appears to be a
product of a then-emerging trend concerning public assistance and
family structure. 14 The emerging trend was towards a more liberal
acceptance of non-traditional family structures and long-term reliance on public assistance. 15
In contrast, Judge Barnes's powerful dissent urged in Gager conformed with more traditional views concerning public assistance, il9. See id. at 476 n.1, 248 A.2d at 386 n.1. See generally REpORT OF THE COMMISSION
TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY AMONG THE RECIPIENTS OF PUBUC WELFARE
MONIES IN THE PROGRAM FOR AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1961) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REpORT]. The Commission was convened by Governor]. Millard
Tawes at the behest of the Maryland General Assembly in 1961. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra, at 4. It consisted of sixteen members. See id. at 11.
10. See, e.g., COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 24-25, 27-28 (discussing Recommendations Two and Seven).
11. See infra notes 46-109 and accompanying text.
12. See Cager, 251 Md. at 501-02,248 A.2d at 400-01 (Barnes,]., dissenting).
13. The term "serial illegitimacy" is used to describe unwed women bearing two
or more children.
14. See generally Loren Miller, Race, Poverty and the Law, 54 CAL. L. REv. 386 (1966)
(discussing constitutional implications of poverty and the law); Robert M.
O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL.
L. REv. 443, 456-78 (1966) (discussing the evolution of the legal concept that
placing conditions on receipt of welfare can have constitutional implications);
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964) (discussing the
emergence of the government in private and societal interests).
15. See generally WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDANT CHILDREN (1965). Assistance to
single mothers had historically been conditioned on strict notions of moral fitness. See id. at 7, 29-30.
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legitimacy, and family structure. 16 Similar values guided the Commission in its work, and the Commission's Report provided much of
the basis for Judge Barnes's dissent. 17
The issues addressed by the Commission and the Cager court
remain at the forefront of public debate. Today, politicians, political
activists, and pundits fiercely contest whether a causal relationship
exists between welfare policies and the rise in illegitimacy over the
past several decades. IS A related issue concerns the claimed link between illegitimacy and several social problems. 19
This Comment will analyze the Cager court's rationale and examine the Commission's Report. Additionally, it will update core
data presented in the report and look at additional related data,
providing a look at a social transformation since the Cager decision.
Finally, this Comment will identify the larger implications of the
Cager holding, discussing both the proper role of the judiciary and
the appropriate source of authority on matters of public policy.

II.

IN RE GAGER

A.

The Trial Court Ruling

In In re Cager, the court of appeals addressed a Circuit Court
for Prince George's County ruling20 that a child living in a home
with one or more illegitimate siblings was neglected within the
meaning of Article 26, Section 52(f) of the Maryland Code. 21 The
16. See Gager, 251 Md. at 499, 248 A.2d at 399; see also COMMISSION REpORT, supra
note 9, at 17-18.
17. See infra notes 162-93 and accompanying text.
18. See JARED TA\LOR, PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE FAILURE OF RACE RElATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 301-D5 (1992) ("Over the tragedy of the underclass, the welfare system casts a long, dark shadow."); see also CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 162-66 (1984) (showing empirical correlation between the
growth in AFDC spending and liberalization of welfare rules with a dramatic
rise in illegitimacy rates among the population receiving benefits). But see Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Gomprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond The
Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. LJ. 1697, 1707 (1993) (discussing the diversity of recipients receiving welfare); Dorothy Roberts, Exploding the Myths Behind New Jersey
Welfare Reform, NJ. LJ., Jan. 25, 1993, at 21 ("[Nlumerous studies have found
no causal relationship between welfare and family size."); Robert Samuelson,
. . . Essential to the Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1993, at A19 ("The idea that
girls have babies to get welfare checks is absurd.").
19. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
20. Circuit Court Judge Bowen presided at the trial. See Gager, 251 Md. at 477,248
A.2d at 287.
21. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) (1966) (repealed 1969), quoted in Gager, 251
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circuit court ruling resolved the cases of three unmarried women,
each of whom had borne successive children out of wedlock. 22
Judge Bowen ordered the children removed from their homes
and placed in foster care upon finding that the minors were neglected children within the meaning of Section 52(f).23 Judge
Bowen based his ruling on criterion 24 six of Section 52(f), which
concerns children living in a home which "fails to provide a stable
Md. at 477 n.l, 248 A.2d at 387 n.1. Section 52(£) defined the term "neglected
child" as a child:
(1) who is without proper guardianship;
(2) whose parent, guardian or person with whom the child lives, by
reason of cruelty, mental incapacity, immorality or depravity, is unfit
to care properly for such a child;
(3) who is under unlawful or improper care, supervision, custody or
restraint, by any person, corporation, agency, association, institution
or other organization or who is unlawfully kept out of school;
(4) whose parent, guardian or custodian neglects or refuses, when
able to do so, to provide necessary medical, surgical, institutional or
hospital care for such child;
(5) who is in such condition of want or suffering, or is under such
improper guardianship or control, or is engaged in such occupation
as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others;
or
(6) who is living in a home which fails to provide a stable moral environment. In determining whether such stable moral environment exists, the court shall consider, among other things, whether the parent, guardian, or person with whom the child lives
(i) Is unable to provide such an environment by reason of immaturity, or emotional, mental or physical disability;
(ii) Is engaging in promiscuous conduct inside or outside the
home;
(iii) Is cohabiting with a person to whom he or she is not
married;
(iv) Is pregnant with an illegitimate child; or
(v) Has, within a period of twelve months preceding the filing
of the petition alleging the child to be neglected, either been
pregnant with or given birth to another child to whose putative
father she was not legally married at the time of conception, or
has not thereafter married.
MD.
CODE art. 26, §52(£) (1966) (repealed 1969).
22. See Gager, 251 Md. at 478 n.2, 248 A.2d at 387 n.2.
23. See id. at 476-77, 248 A.2d at 386-88.
24. For purposes of this article, Sections 56(£)(1) through 56(£)(6) will be hereinafter referred to as criteria one through six; Sections 56(£) (5) (i) through
56(£) (5) (v) referred to as sub-criteria one through five. See generally supra note
21 (providing full text of Section 56(£).

ANN:
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moral environment."25
In determining whether a home provides a "stable moral environment," the legislature prescribed five sub-criteria that a court
should consider, including whether the parent or guardian with
whom a child lives "[i] s pregnant with an illegitimate child; or
[has,] within a period of twelve months preceding the filing of the
petition alleging [neglect,] ... been pregnant with or given birth to
another child to whose putative father she was not legally married . . . or has not thereafter married. "26
Judge Bowen anticipated that resolution of the cases would
have important implications. He described the cases before him as
"test cases" that would "determine whether ... [s]tate law furnishes
a vehicle to assist in the control of the problem of illegitimacy, its
mounting costs to the taxpayers, and its mounting costs in human
misery and suffering."27 Proceeding on a record of stipulated facts,
the judge ruled in favor of the county.28 He held that bearing more
than one illegitimate child was alone sufficient to support a finding
that a child was neglected and living in "an unstable moral environment" within the meaning of Section 52(f) (6) .29
Represented by attorneys ad litem, the unwed mothers filed suit
challenging the county's application of Section 52(f).30 The mothers
25: [d. at 477 n.l, 248 A.2d at 386 n.l (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) (6)
(1966) (repealed 1969».
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f)(6)(iv)-(v) (1966) (repealed 1969). See supra
note 21 for full text of Section 52(f).
27. Cager, 251 Md. at 477, 248 A.2d at 387.
28. See id. at 477 n.2, 248 A.2d at 387 n.2. The parties stipulated that the children
were illegitimate. See id. In his dissent, Judge Bames observed that the use of
information from a mother's AFDC application to initiate neglect proceedings
was not properly before the court and should not have been addressed by the
majority. See id. at 502, 248 A.2d at 401 (Bames,]., dissenting).
29. [d. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387. In the circuit court, Judge Bowen had little difficulty concluding that such an environment "relaters] or [was] intended to relate to a situation where a mother has had a series of illegitimate children
[as] .... in these cases," and he asserted that" [m]ost first illegitimate children ... are the result of mistakes." [d. Judge Bowen continued, "The second
time around ... demonstrates an unstable moral attitude ... that is inconsistent with the minimum moral standard the community requires." [d. Likewise,
the dissenting judge on the court of appeals further opined "that by . . . engaging in sexual relations with men, that produce illegitimate children, [a single woman] has demonstrated in the most forceful and irrefutable way that
she either does not care for the views of society . . . or ... is unable to conform." [d. at 498, 248 A.2d at 398-99 (Bames,]. dissenting).
30. See Cager, 251 Md. at 476-77, 248 A.2d at 386-87.
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specifically challenged the circuit court's conclusion that multiple illegitimate births, standing alone, was sufficient grounds to deem
their children neglected under the statute. 31

B.

The Court of Appeals opinion

The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the circuit court32
and held that an illegitimate child may not be found neglected
under Section 52 (f) based solely upon the fact that the child lives
with illegitimate siblings. 33 The court's holding was based on its interpretation of the phrase "among other things," preceding the five
sub-criteria specified at Section 52(f) (6),34 which a court must consider in determining whether a child is in a stable moral environment. 35 The court concluded that the "other things" to be considered include the preceding five primary criteria, in addition to the
five sub-criteria. 36 Thus, the court of appeals held that a "fail[ure]
to provide a stable moral environment" under criterion six could
not be established solely upon a showing of the presence of one or
two of the sub-criteriaY The majority held that criterion one
through five were as essential to discerning a "stable moral environment" as the five sub-criteria prescribed in criterion Six. 38 The court
also found that there was nothing explicit in Section 52(f) to suggest that the mere presence of more than one illegitimate child
was, . by itself, sufficient grounds for a finding of neglect, and that
such a reading could not be reasonably inferred as within the
meaning of Section 52(f) .39
Analyzing criteria one through five, the court discerned that
the underlying purposes of the statute were to prevent "unlawful or
31. See id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, amicus briefs arguing in favor of the mothers were filed by Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Planned Parenthood Association of
Maryland, Inc., Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc.,
and the Washington Chapter of the Medical Committee for Human Rights. See
id. at 477, 248 A.2d at 387.
32. See id. at 486, 248 A.2d at 392.
33. Id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387.
34. See supra notes 21, 24 (providing full text of Section 52(£) and explaining categorizing of criteria and sub-criteria, respectively).
35. eager, 251 Md. at 479, 248 A.2d at 388 (quoting MD. ANN CODE art. 26,
§ 52(£)(6) (1966) (repealed 1969».
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
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improper care, supervision or restraint" of children, and to provide
a lawful basis for state intervention when there has been a failure by
a parent or custodian to provide proper care or make adequate
provisions for a child. 40 Such factors, the court held, must be considered prior to any valid finding of neglect under Section 52(f) .41
The court of appeals also noted that the state has parens patria(P authority, and that the provisions of Article 26 concerning
juveniles must be utilized in a manner consistent with the objective
of child protection, which is integral to that authority.43 The ultimate standard to be used in determining child custody questions is
"the best interest of the child," which mayor may not be served by
removing a child from a home in instances of consecutive illegitimate childbearing.44 The court also based its holding on its understanding of the AFDC program requirements as administered by the
states, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court rulings concerning the legal status of illegitimate children and the scope of
state discretion regarding administration of the AFDC program. 45
The court first cited Levy v. Louisiancf6 as comparative authority for
the proposition that the illegitimacy of a child or a child's siblings
cannot serve as the sole measure of either a child's best interests or
the suitability of a particular home. 47
Levy concerned the right of illegitimate children to bring a civil
action under Louisiana's wrongful death statute. 48 The statute pro40. Id. at 478-79, 248 A.2d at 387-88.
41. See id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387-88.
42. See id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388 (quoting Ex Parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 308,
192 A.2d 775, 777 (1963». Literally, parens patriae means "parent of the country." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). This common law doctrine
stands for the proposition that the sovereign has both the right and duty to
act as guardian of minors and others critically lacking capacity, such as the insane. See id.
43. See Cager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388.
44. Id. at 479-80, 248 A.2d at 388. Evaluating a child's best interests is an inherent
equitable power of the court. See, e.g., Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 655
A.2d 901 (1995) (determining visitation rights of grandparents); Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 488 A.2d 157 (1985) (awarding visitation rights to nonadoptive stepmother); Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119,372 A.2d 1231 (1977) (holding that an equity court's determinations concerning a child's best interests
may be disturbed only on grounds of a clear abuse of discretion).
45. See Cager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89; see also infra notes 47-89 and accompanying text.
46. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
47. See Cager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388.
48. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 69.
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vided that such suits could be brought by various relatives of a deceased, including the decedent's children. 49 The Louisiana Court of
Appeals upheld a dismissal of an action seeking recovery under the
statute by a trial court50 which held that the term "children" only
included legitimate children. 51 The Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari. 52
The United States Supreme Court held that the statute, as construed by Louisiana's courts, was invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 53 The Court found that the
purpose of providing children with standing under the wrongful
death statute was to provide an avenue for compensation of all who
had benefitted from an "intimate, familial relationship between a
child and ... [a parent]. "54 The statute's purpose was frustrated by
placing illegitimate children into a separate category of persons
who, although they may have equally benefitted from such a relationship, were nonetheless not entitled to bring suit. 55 Moreover,
the Court held that there were no redeeming rationales for such an
exclusion. 56 It rejected both of Louisiana's public policy arguments
in defense of the State's construction of the statuteY Therefore, the
classification was held not "rational,"58 hence invidious 59 and
unconstitutional. 60
Even if one completely accepts the Levy holding,61 the decision
49. See id. (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1967) ("The right to
recover ... shall survive for a period of one year ... in favor of: (1) the surviving ... children of the deceased . . . [a] right to recover damages under
the provisions of this paragraph is a property right which ... is inherited by
[a decedent's] legal, instituted, or irregular heirs . . . . As used in this article,
the [word] 'child' ... include[s] a child ... by adoption .... n».
50. See Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 194 (La. Ct. App. 1966), reu'd, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
51. See id. at 195. The court's decision was based in part on a finding that "morals
and [the] general welfare" would be better preserved because the ruling
would ostensibly have the effect of discouraging illegitimacy. [d.
52. See Levy v. State, 193 So. 2d 530 (La. 1967), reu'd, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
53. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 71-72.
54. [d. at 71.
55. See id. at 71-72.
56. See id. at 70-72.
57. See id. Specifically, the State argued that its construction encouraged marriage
and legitimization of children. See id.
58. [d. at 71.
59. See id. at 72.
60. See id. at 71-72.
61. [d. Justices Harlan, Black, and Stewart were critical of the majority holding. See
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had no relevance to the issue in Gager. Gager was concerned with
the grounds upon which the state, acting pursuant to its specific authority to administer AFDC for the purpose of protecting children,
determines whether a child is living in a morally unstable, neglectful environment. 62 A holding that illegitimate children of any age
cannot be denied standing under a statutory cause of action has no
bearing on the questions at issue in Gager. 63 Furthermore, as discussed in more detail below in the context of King v. Smith,64 the
facts of Gager concerned a series of state actions intended to provide
better living conditions and material well-being to illegitimate
children.
The purpose of Section 52(f) was not to deny anything to illegitimate children. If Section 52(f) denied anything, it was the exposure of illegitimate children to home conditions that the legislature
deemed harmful based on the findings and recommendations of
the Commission. 65 Indeed, the trial judge in Gager did not address
the legal rights of illegitimate children as such. 66 Rather, he addressed the authority of the state to act to protect the interests of
putatively neglected minors.67 Instead of being denied a state benefit or being discriminated against; the children in Gager were being

62.
63.
64.

65.

66.
67.

id. at 72, 76-82 (Harlan, Black, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting in a single dissent to the majority opinions in both Levy and Glona v. American Guar.
& Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968». Glona concerned an insurance claim
for a deceased illegitimate child made pursuant to Louisiana's wrongful death
statute. See Glona, 391 U.S. at 73-74. The dissenters argued that the majority
had arbitrarily decreed that biological relation, rather than legal relation, was
the proper basis for suit under the statute, asserting that such a notion is inconsistent with the nature of wrongful death suits. See id. at 75-76. The dissenters noted that such suits are inherently limited by the enabling statute's listing
of proper plaintiffs, which historically have tended strongly to identify such
plaintiffs in terms of legal, not biological relations. See id. at 76-79.
See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 476-77, 248 A.2d 384, 386-87 (1968); see also supra
note 21 (providing full text of Section 56(f».
See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
392 U.S. 309 (1968) (holding that a state may not deny AFDC assistance to dependent children based on a parents immorality or to prevent illegitimacy);
see infra notes 73-109.
See infra notes 170-83 and accompanying text. The Commission Report stated
that the purpose of Recommendations Two and Seven, which were adopted almost verbatim by the legislature as Section 52(f), was to protect children from
being harmed by surroundings of moral squalor. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra
note 9, at 25, 28.
See generally Gager, 251 Md. at 477-78, 248 A.2d at 387.
See id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387.
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afforded an extraordinary measure of protection which, prior to the
passage of Section 52(f), would have been unavailable to them. 68
The court of appeals utterly confused the matter by inferring
that the issues in Levy and Gager were comparable. Logically, there
is no parallel. In Levy, the Court's finding of invidious discrimination was based on an actual denial of a legal right-the right to
bring a wrongful death action. 69 On the other hand, the issue in
Gager was not a denial of a state right or benefit in any sense,7° but
an interpretation of a statute intended to protect children. 71 Therefore, while it may be unclear whether a child's best interests are invariably served by placing the child in foster care when there have
been successive illegitimate births in the child's home, it is quite
clear that Levy neither supports that conclusion nor addresses analogous issues.
In conjunction with Levy, the court of appeals also cited King v.
Smith,72 which stands for the proposition that a state may not deny
AFDC assistance to dependent children "on the basis of their
mother's alleged immorality or to discourage illegitim[acy] ."73 King
concerned the "man in the house" or "substitute father" regulations, which had characterized state administration of AFDC plans
throughout the history of the program. 74 King arose from Alabama's
denial of AFDC benefits to an unwed mother based on the determination that she had maintained regular '~cohabitation"75 in her
home with a man.1 6
68. Prior to the enactment of Section 52(f), the state did not have a means of removing such children from a home environment determined to be neglectful.
See infra notes 164-93 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
70. The record did not disclose whether the children continued to receive AFDC
benefits. See Cager, 251 Md. at 480,248 A.2d at 388-89. AFDC eligibility is based
solely on the financial situation of the legal guardian of minor children. See 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (A)-(B) (1997). Whether the children would be deprived of
AFDC benefits in their new homes would therefore depend on an independent assessment of the neediness of the new home. See generally id.
71. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
72. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
73. Cager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89 (quoting King, 392 U.S. at 324).
74. See BELL, supra note 15, at 7, 28.
75. See King, 392 U.S. at 311. The term "cohabitation," as applied to the enforcement of substitute father regulations, invariably referred to sexual intimacy. See
BELL, supra note 15, at 98-99. See infra note 76 for the text of the Alabama
regulation.
.
76. See King, 392 U.S. at 315. The Alabama regulation provided:
[A]n able bodied man, married or single, is considered a substitute
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The regulation challenged in King allowed the state to disqualify families from receiving AFDC payments if the mother cohabits
with a man. 77 This result was achieved by defining a man as a present, providing parent under circumstances where the man in question was not legally obligated to support the children,78 not present
in the home, or not supporting the children in fact.79 The regulation was adopted to work in conjunction with AFDC eligibility requirements. 8o Since its inception, AFDC benefits were for children
"deprived of parental support" due to a parent being "continually
absent from the home."81 Under the Alabama regulation challenged
in King and similar regulations in other states,82 a man cohabiting
with a woman receiving AFDC assistance was designated a substitute
parent or man in the house whose presence in the mother's life was
determined to violate the statutory requirement that a parent be

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.

father of all the children of the applicant ... (1) if 'he lives in the
home with the child's . . . mother for the purpose of cohabitation';
or (2) if 'he visits [the home] frequently for the purpose of cohab:iting with the child's ... mother'; or (3) if 'he ... cohabits with the
child's natural or adoptive mother elsewhere.'
[d. at 313-14 (quoting Al.ABAMA MANuAL FOR ADMINISTRATION OF PUBUC AsSISTANCE, pt. I, ch. II, § VI).
Between 1964, when Alabama adopted the regulation, and 1967, the state
experienced a 22% decline in AFDC children recipients (the number of children receiving AFDC benefits). See id. at 315.
See id. at 314.
See id. at 327.
See id. at 314 (quoting Al.ABAMA MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATION OF PuBuc AssISTANCE, pt. I, ch. II, § VI (defining a man as a substitute parent».
See id. at 313.
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1994). This section provides:
The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home (other than absence occasioned solely
by reason of the performance of active duty in the uniformed services of the United States), or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother,
stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of
residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their
own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) at
the option of the State, under the age of nineteen and a full-time
student in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of vocational or technical training).
[d.
See BELL, supra note 15, at 76-81, 88.
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continually absent from a home for a remaining parent to be eligible for AFDC.83 Thus, a finding that a substitute father was present
would provide administrators with grounds for disqualifying the
home from further AFDC benefits. 84
While the Supreme Court conceded that such state rules had
been both permissible and commonplace throughout most of the
program's history,85 the Court declared the Alabama rule invalid
due to Congress's adoption of the "Flemming Ruling."86 The Flemming Ruling, which was promulgated in 1961 by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, provided that "[a] state plan . . .
may not impose an eligibility condition that would deny assistance
with respect to a needy child on the basis that the home conditions
in which the child lives are unsuitable, while the child continues to reside in the home."87 The ruling was subsequently enacted by statute,
and incorporated into the Social Security ACt. 88
The issue in King, and the rationale for the Flemming Ruling
upon which the King decision was based, was that to deny AFDC
benefits to families without making alternate provisions for the welfare of children who had been supported through the program
would not be in the best interest of the child. 89 The King decision
83.
84.
85.
86.

See King, 392 U.S. at 314.
See id. at 313.
See id. at 321; see also BELL, supra note 15, at 76-92.
See King, 392 U.S. at 325-26. The Flemming Ruling was named after Arthur F.
Flemming, then Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. See id. at 322. See generally BELL,_ supra note 15, at 147-51 (discussing the Flemming Rule).
87. King, 392 U.S. at 325-26 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
88. See id. at 323; see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994) (repealed 1996).
89. See King, 392 U.S. at 325-26 n.22; see also BELL, supra note 15, at 147. Secretary
Fleming said of the ruling:
Effective July 1, 1961, a state plan ... may not impose an eligibility
condition that would deny assistance with respect to a needy child on
the basis that the home conditions in which the child lives are unsuitable, while the child continues to reside in the home. Assistance will
therefore be continued during the time efforts are being made either to improve the home conditions or to make arrangements for
the child elsewhere.
It is of great importance that state agencies should be concerned about the effects on children of the environment in which they are living and that services
be provided which will be directed toward affording the children maximum
protection and strengthening family life. Whenever there is a question
of the suitability of the home for the child's upbringing, steps should
be taken to correct the situation or, in the alternative, to arrange for
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analyzed Alabama's demonstrated willingness to deny AFDC assistance in response to an unwed mother's behavior while leaving the
children in a home situation that had been deemed unsuitable,
thereby depriving the children of the needed care and assistance of
AFDC benefits. 90 Mter the statutory adoption of the Flemming Ruling, and despite longstanding practice to the contrary,91 the King
Court held that there remained no permissible grounds for denying
AFDC benefits to families otherwise qualified, including state efforts
to control illegitimate childbearing or to discourage sexual promiscuity, if the children were to be left in the home after termination
of benefits. 92
Interestingly, the Cager majority acknowledged that King had
specifically recognized the states' right to remove children from
homes found to be neglectful or unsuitable. 93 Indeed, concerning illegitimacy and the states' right to take measures to discourage illegitimacy, the King Court stated:
[T] he question of Alabama's general power to deal with
conduct it regards as immoral and with the problem of illegitimacy [is not involved in this case]. This appeal [only
raises] the question [ofl whether the State may deal with these
problems in the manner that it has here-lJy flatly denying AFDC
assistance to otherwise eligible dependent children.
Alabama's ... interests in discouraging immorality and illegitimacy . . . are not presently legitimate justifications for AFDC
disqualification. 94
The rationale for the Flemming Ruling and its statutory enactment could not be reasonably construed as an effort to discourage
or otherwise affect state efforts to control or discourage illegiti-

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

other appropriate care of the child. It is completely inconsistent, however,
to declare a home unsuitable for a child to receive assistance and at
the same time permit him to remain in the same home exposed to
the same environment.
BELL, supra note IS, at 147 (emphasis added).
See King, 392 U.S. at 311.
See BELL, supra note 15, at 76-92; see also id. at 93-110.
See King, 342 U.S. at 324.
See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 480, 248 A.2d 384, 388-99 (1968).
King, 392 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added); see also Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552
(1970). The Court said of its ruling in King: "King v. Smith held only that a legal obligation to support [children] was a necessary condition for qualification as a [non-absent] 'parent' [under AFDC regulations]." Lewis, 397 U.S. at
559.
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macy.95 The provision was not intended to address state efforts to
evaluate the moral stability of home conditions on grounds of serial
illegitimacy, nor was it intended to otherwise speak to the moral belief that illegitimacy was socially harmful, inherently harmful to children personally, or properly within the purview of traditional state
powers with respect to child welfare. 96
In Gager, the very basis for suit was that Maryland authorities
had made alternate provisions for the children in question, which
had not been the case in King. 97 Therefore, the King Court's holding, striking down Alabama's categorical denial of AFDC benefits to
women and their children as a means of discouraging illegitimacy,
offered no guidance as to the pivotal issue in Gager. whether a child
is in a stable moral environment. 98
The Gager court's misplaced reliance on King was also obscured
by two misleading arguments. First, the Gager court focused on the
issue of AFDC benefits and their eligibility requirement. 99 The court
declared that "a State may not deny AFDC assistance to dependent
children 'on the basis of their mother's alleged immorality or to discourage illegitimate births.' "100 Although legally correct, this statement was irrelevant to the facts in Gager. The children in Gager had
not been denied AFDC assistance in the manner addressed in either King or the Flemming ruling. These children were not being
left in a home which had been disqualified from AFDC eligibility
on the grounds of poor home conditions. 101 To the contrary, the
Gager children were placed in foster care,102 and Maryland made
"provision [s] . . . for adequate care and assistance" in compliance
95. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
96. The King decision was followed two years later by Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552
(1970), which went further by invalidating Man Assuming the Role of Spouse
(MARS) regulations. Under MARS regulations, the income of a man actually
residing in a home was counted in assessing a household's AFDC eligibility. See
Lewis, 397 U.S. at 554. MARS regulations were fundamentally different from
Man in the House rules because the latter made eligibility dependent on a
mother's conduct. See King, 392 U.S. at 324. On the other hand, MARS regulations were not aimed at behavior modification, but were instead concerned
solely with household members and their assets. See Lewis, 397 U.S. at 554.
97. See Gager, 251 Md. at 476-77, 248 A.2d at 386-87. The children were placed in
foster homes. See id.
98. See id. at 477-78, 248 A.2d at 387.
99. See id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89.
100. Id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89 (quoting King, 392 U.S. at 324).
101. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
102. See Gager, 251 Md. at 477, 248 A.2d at 387.
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with the AFDC requirements. 103
Second, the majority imputed to the Prince George's County
State's Attorney the purportedly evil motive of seeking only to punish mothers for engaging in behavior of which the State's Attorney
personally disapproved. I04 The court indicated that the State's actions and ill motive proceeded outside the proper scope of state authority with regard to AFDC administration and lacked concern for
the children. lOS The claim that the State's Attorney acted to "use the
children as pawns in a plan to punish their mothers for their past
promiscuity and to discourage them and other females of like weaknesses and inclinations from future [childbearing],"106 however, is
answered by the preceding discussion of the grounds for the King
decision. I07 Maryland authorities had not acted in ways that King or
statutory law had deemed impermissible. Rather, Maryland had provided for adequate care and assistance outside the context of
AFDC.I08 Thus, if there had been a crusade against illegitimate
childbearing, as the Cager majority characterized the State's Attorney's actions, it was a crusade mounted not by the State's Attorney,
but by the legislature, acting within the constraints of legitimate authority.l09 If there was a crusade by the legislature, it could not be
justifiably characterized as either impermissible or unwarranted.
The majority also found critical fault in the State's Attorney's
use of confidential information from the plaintiffs' AFDC applications. llo The mothers' applications revealed to county authorities
that the names of the fathers and their respective children did not
match, which provided the State's Attorney with statutory grounds
to initiate investigations. III
The court found that federal guidelines l12 and accompanying
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1994); see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 48A (1995).
See Cager at 481, 248 A.2d at 389.
See id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89.
Id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 389.
See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
See Cager, 251 Md. at 481-82, 248 A.2d at 389.
See id. at 482, 248 A.2d at 389.
See id. The court simply refers to "[a] regulation of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare," without further explanation. Id. at
482, 248 A.2d at 390. The court was apparently referring to a statute which
provided, "[A state plan must] provide safeguards which restrict the use or
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients."
42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (9) (1994) (repealed 1996).
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state regulations l13 forbade using information gathered for program
administration in ways tending to subject applicants to "exploitation
and embarrassment," or that would constitute use of information
for a purpose other than that for which it was provided. 114 The
court stated that such information must "be used only by persons
with appropriate authority, and only for purposes directly connected
with the administration of welfare programs." 115
Again, the court's conclusion merits close examination. The
statutory requirement of confidentiality regarding records of AFDC
participants expressly permits the use of such information in furtherance of an investigation or civil proceeding that concerns plan
participants. 116 The statute also provides that investigating and interceding in instances of suspected or actual neglect is not only permitted, but required of state plans. ll7
Other fundamental objections can be made about the Gager
majority's assertions concerning proper administrative purposes
within the context of an approved state AFDC plan and the scope
113. See Gager, 251 Md. at 482, 248 A.2d at 390. (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 5
(1995), and The State Department of Public Welfare Rule 1000, Confidential
Nature of Records).
114. [d. at 482, 248 A.2d at 390.
115. [d. This language echoed the pertinent statutory provision, found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 602 (a) (9) (1994) (repealed 1996), which mandated that a state plan:
Provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of information
concerning applicants or recipients for purposes directly connected
with (A) the administration of the plan of the State ... (B) any investigation, prosecution, or . . . civil proceeding, conducted in connection with the administration of any such plan or program ... (D)
any audit or similar activity conducted ... by any governmental entity which is authorized by law to conduct such audit or activity, and
(E) reporting and providing information ... with respect to known
or suspected child abuse or neglect.

42 U.S.C. § 602 (1994) (repealed 1996). Furthermore, the prior § 602
(a) (16)(A) mandated that the state agency charged with administering AFDC
"[r]eport to an appropriate agency or official, known or suspected instances
of . . . negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child receiving aid . . .
under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is
threatened." [d.
116. See supra note 115.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(9) (B) (1994) (repealed 1996). Specifically, the statute
authorized that civil proceedings be undertaken within the context of administering the plan, but monitoring and responding to neglect was an authorized administrative objective under § 602(a)(16)(A). See supra note 115
for text of both § 602 (a)(9) (B) and § 602(a) (16)(A).
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of state law enforcement authority within the context of AFDC administration. These objections, grounded in the origin and design
of the AFDC program, are best addressed in the larger context of
Judge Barnes's dissent. lIs In the course of his dissent, Judge Barnes
persuasively rebutted the majority's reading of Section 52(f) and
demonstrated that the majority's understanding of the statute was
not only unreasonable, but would strip the statute of all meaning
and effect. 1I9
The dissent focused on the origin of Section 52 (f) which was
derived from recommendations of the Commission. 120 A review of
the Commission's working assumptions, and the legislature's subsequent adoption of measures pursuant to the Commission's findings
and recommendations, including the statutory provisions challenged
in Cager, will provide the complete backdrop against which the majority decision can be fully appreciated.
III. JUDGE BARNES'S DISSENT AND THE COMMISSION TO
STUDY PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY
In his dissent in Cager, Judge Barnes staunchly defended the
State's Attorney's use of information acquired from welfare applications to initiate the child neglect investigations. 121 He argued that
the State's Attorney's actions were proper and well within the scope
of state and federal regulations,122 whereas the majority found that
the State's Attorney had abused his authority.123 Judge Barnes also
argued that the State's Attorney's actions in his capacity as an administrative agent, effectuating the intent of the statute which required his actions, were not only consistent with the goals of the
AFDC program, but were essential to its proper fulfillment. l24
Judge Barnes noted that state statutes and regulations governing the administration of AFDCI25 require that neglect proceed118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

125.

See infra notes 118-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 144-59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 501-D2, 248 A.2d. 384, 40O-D1 (1968) (Barnes, J.
dissenting) .
See id. (Barnes, J., dissenting).
See id. at 483, 248 A.2d at 390.
See id. at 502, 248 A.2d at 401 (Barnes, J. dissenting). See infra notes 121-34
and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes and guidelines governing administration of AFDC by the states and the breadth of administrative
discretion the states were originally intended to exert over AFDC programs
with respect to child welfare.
Each state plan must be submitted to the United States Secretary of Health
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ings be instituted "when information obtained by the Welfare Department indicates that a child is neglected." 126 This regulation
merely implements the federal requirement that state plans provide
a means to ascertain and act upon apparent instances of neglect. 127
Moreover, although federal law specifies that detecting and preventing neglect is a proper administrative aim of state plans, it imposes
no preemptive definition 'of neglect. 128 As Judge Barnes declared:
"The information on Form 218 may be used in the investigation of
cases of apparent neglect as such an investigation is directly connected with the welfare program. "129 The State's Attorney is unquestionably "an appropriate authority" to whom neglect should be reported, and investigating instances of alleged neglect for the
purpose of possibly removing a child from a home is a "criminal or
civil proceeding, conducted in connection with the administration
of [a] plan."130 Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain who, other than a
prosecutor, could possibly be expected to conduct such an inquiry.
Therefore, Judge Barnes observed, when acting on information concerning neglect, information provided in compliance with Section
48A of the Maryland Code, the State's Attorney "[is] merely an administrative agent for the Welfare Department .... "131 Thus, "it [is]
the duty of the State's Attorney to file an appropriate petition to ascertain whether or not the child was a neglected child as defined by
the statute. "132
It is instructive to consider Judge Barnes's statements concerning the fundamental purpose of AFDC in the context of the state
actions challenged in eager. Because the very purpose of the program is to advance the well-being of qualified children,133 Judge

126.
127.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

and Human Services (then Health, Education, and Welfare) for approval
before a state may receive AFDC federal matching funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1994) (repealed 1996).
Cager, 251 Md. at 501, 248 A.2d at 400 (Barnes, J., dissenting) (citing MD. ANN.
CODE art. 88A, § 48A (1996 Supp.».
See 42 U.S.C. § 602(16)(A) (1996 Supp.). Section 602 (16)(A) requires that
state agencies "report to an appropriate agency or official, known or suspected instances of ... negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child receiving aid [from the state's public assistance program]." [d.
See supra note 115.
Cager, 251 Md. at 501, 248 A.2d at 400.
42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (9) (1994) (repealed 1996).
Cager, 251 Md. at 502, 248 A.2d at 401.
[d.
See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (repealed 1996) ("[e]ncouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives . . . and
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Barnes observed that" [i] t can hardly be contended that it is a purpose of the AFDC program to subsidize those who neglect their
children or to provide for the continuance of the neglect of a
child!"134 To the contrary, establishing means of shielding children
from neglect is more than an administrative aim "directly connected with the administration of [AFDC]."135 It is an indispensable
component of any program with aims such as those envisioned by
AFDC: "The removal of neglected children from that assistance, the
placing of them in proper foster homes or providing for other
proper methods for eliminating the neglect must, of necessity, be
directly connected with the administration of the welfare
program." 136
Regarding Judge Barnes's remarks on the overreaching purpose
of the 'AFDC program, it is also instructive to consider the policy
goals behind the creation of AFDC. AFDC was originally intended
as a program for orphans and widows,137 for children and a parent
or guardian who had been abandoned by a breadwinner or had
been "deprived of support" due to the illness, death, or sudden incapacity of a breadwinner, or for minor children where other circumstances had left a mother, or other named relative or legal
guardian,138 incapable of supporting the children under his or her
care. The program was not intended to redefine the family, to foreclose or preempt family formation, or to undermine the institution
of fatherhood and the paternal ordering of American society.139

134.

135.
136.

137.
138.
139.

[to] strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with
the maintenance of parental care and protection" (emphasis added».
Cager, 251 Md. at 502, 248 A.2d at 401 (Barnes, j., dissenting). Furthermore,
because the case was before the court on stipulated facts conceding the illegitimacy of the children in question, and determining such was the only purpose
for which Form 218 was employed by the State, the issue of whether the use
of Form 218 was appropriate was foreclosed from review by the court. See id.
(Barnes, j., dissenting).
[d. (Barnes, j., dissenting).
[d. (Barnes, j., dissenting). Furthermore, although 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (15) (A)
provides that a state develop programs for family planning and contraception,
it must be noted that this provision did not preclude other approaches to address out-of-wedlock childbearing. See 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(15)(A) (1994) (repealed 1996).
See Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REv.
879,880 (1994); see also BELL, supra note 15, at 3-19.
See Irene Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of AFDC Program Since 1935, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 825, 826 (1974) (discussing the origin of AFDC).
See generally STEVEN GoLDBERG, WHY MEN RULE: A THEORY OF MALE DOMINANCE
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Family circumstances targeted by AFDC policy objectives are
clearly distinguishable from those present in Gager,140 as well as
those to which Section 52 (f) (6) could have applied. Because illegitimacy often involves men who have never acted as providers to their
children, and who have never been present a~ a parent in the
home, it is reasonable to doubt whether a child under such circumstances has been deprived of the support of a now-absent parent in
the specific manner contemplated by the framers of AFDC. It is also
reasonable to contemplate that children in multiple illegitimate sibling, single mother families, the situation to which Section 52(f) applies,· are less deprived than neglected. 141
The high ratio of women who were never married, particularly
younger women on the AFDC roster, is a relatively recent development. 142 From 1942 to 1967, the percentage of women heads of
households eligible for AFDC whose reason for eligibility was defined as the "single motherhood of a woman who had never been
married" increased from ten percent to approximately twenty-eight
percent. 143 While widowhood or physical disability combined to account for some fifty-nine percent of AFDC eligibility in 1942, those
combined categories accounted for less than twenty percent of the
basis for AFDC eligibility in 1967 and less than seven percent of the
basis for AFDC eligibility as of 1992,144 Moreover, because AFDC was
instituted to "help maintain and strengthen family life"145 and to
"help . . . parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for . . .
maximum self-support and personal independence,"I46 it is indisputable that serial illegitimacy, without means of support other than

140.

141.
142.
143.

144.

145.

(1993) (discussing the anthropological and sociological aspects of the writer's
view of a paternalistic society).
See Gager, 251 Md. at 478 n.2, 248 A.2d at 387 n.2. In addition to being unwed,
two of the mothers were teenagers. See id.
See supra note 21 for a discussion of § 52(f).
See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REpORT TO CONGRESS ON
OUT-QF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING, DHH PUB.No. (PHS) 95-1257, 63 (1995).
[hereinafter REpORT TO CONGRESS]. The figure as of 1992 was fIfty-eight percent. See id.
See id. However, the percentage of AFDC-eligible mothers for whom grounds
for eligibility is separation or divorce from a husband has remained comparatively constant, increasing from approximately 25% in 1942 to approximately
35% in 1992. See id. The figure for 1992 actually represented a significant decline for this category of eligibility from a peak of nearly 45% in 1967. See id.
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (repealed 1996) (emphasis added).

146. [d.
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public assistance, is profoundly contrary to the foundational objectives of the program.
The facts in Cager were typical of the rapidly changing structure
of AFDC households at that time, and the increasing tendency of
such households to be formed in a manner quite different from the
average AFDC-eligible household when the program was first
adopted. 147 Judge Barnes's assertions concerning the rationale underlying AFDC and the proper scope of state administrative discretion in light of AFDC's original aims were therefore entirely correct.
It is a matter of speculation, of course, whether present circumstances, had they prevailed in 1935, would have altered or even prevented adoption of the AFDC program, or whether AFDC would be
adopted today in the same form in response to present
circumstances. 148
Judge Barnes assailed the majority's reading of both the statute
. itself and the necessary interrelation of the provisions of Section
52(f) .149 In particular, he found indefensible the majority's conclusion that the legislature had not intended for serial illegitimacy to
be sufficient grounds to constitute neglect. 150 Judge Barnes began by
noting that the six primary criteria enumerated in Section 52 (f) are
separated by semicolons with the final criterion preceded by the disjunctive connector "or," indicating that the criteria are alternative
rather than cumulative. 151 He also pointed out that the statute could
not possibly have been meant to require a showing of all six criteria
as a precondition to enforceability.152 For example, Judge Barnes
questioned how the fourth criterion, referring to a child whose
guardian or parent fails to provide necessary medical, surgical, institutional or hospital care, could not be sufficient in itself to amount
to neglect. 153 He also questioned how the legislature could have
147. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
148. The 105th Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which ended AFDC as a federal entitlement.
See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1994). PRWORA turned AFDC into a program of block
grants given to the states. See id. The states have expanded discretion to independently administer all aspects of the program. See id. Also, for the first time,
PROWRA mandates work requirements for specified adult beneficiaries. See 42
U.S.C. § 607 (b) (2) (a) (1994).
149. See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 486-501, 248 A.2d 384, 392400 (1968) (Barnes, J.,
dissenting).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 486, 248 A.2d at 392; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
152. See Cager, 251 Md. at 487-88, 248 A.2d at 393.
153. See id. at 487, 248 A.2d at 393.
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meant for such neglect to be ignored by state officials unless another listed criterion of neglect were found to also be present. He
reasoned that if the six primary criteria of neglect were not alternative, but could only be proven if concurrently present with at least
one other criteria, it would be practically impossible for a child to
ever be deemed neglected under the statute. 154 Criterion six and its
five su1:rcriteria, Judge Barnes concluded, must be a self contained
set of considerations, sufficient in themselves to establish whether
an environment is morally stable.155
To further demonstrate that the majority's interpretation was
untenable, Judge Barnes discussed the court of appeals's statutory
construction in In re Cromwell 156 Cromwell involved a determination
of juvenile delinquency under Article 26, Section 52 (e), which identically paralleled Section 52 (f) in structure. 157 In Cromwell, the court
found "delinquency" to be proven on the basis of a single criterion,158 without any suggestion that a concurrence of multiple criteria was necessary. Judge Barnes applied this same reasoning in his
dissent in Cager, observing that the six criteria of Section 52(f) must
each be independently sufficient to establish neglect. 159 Further,
Judge Barnes noted that the five su1:rcriteria for ascertaining a "stable moral environment" are set out in a format identical to that emSee id. at 487-88, 248 A.2d at 393.
See id.
232 Md. 409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963).
Cromwell quoted the pertinent section of the statute at issue, MD. ANN. CODE
OF 1957 art. 26, § 52(e), as follows:
(e) "Delinquent child" means a child
(1) who violates any law or ordinance, or who commits any act
which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment;
(2) who is incorrigible or ungovernable or habitually disobedient or who is beyond the control of his parents, guardian, custodian or other lawful authority;
(3) who is habitually a truant;
(4) who without just cause and without the consent of his parents, guardian, or other custodian, repeatedly deserts his home
or place of abode;
(5) who is engaged in any occupation which is in violation of
law, or who associates with immoral or vicious persons; or
(6) who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals
of himself or others.
Cromwell, 232 Md. at 412, 194 A.2d at 89.
158. See id. at 414, 194 A.2d at 90.
159. See Cager, 251 Md. at 486, 248 A.2d at 392.

154.
155.
156.
157.
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ployed in Cromwell for ascertaining delinquency160 and, therefore,
must also be both alternative and individually sufficient. 161 Indeed,
as with the six primary criteria, a requirement that the five subcriteria be understood as concurrent rather than alternative determinants of neglect would certainly doom the statute to
unenforceability.162
To illustrate, a mother would need to have given birth to an illegitimate child in the twelve months prior to the filing of a neglect
petition (sub-criterion five), and be currently pregnant with another
illegitimate child at the time a petition is filed (sub-criterion six),
before criterion six would be enforceable, a result Judge Barnes described as "absurd and unjust."163 Therefore, Judge Barnes maintained that the statutory requirement that courts consider the five
listed sub-criteria "among other things" should be understood to
mean only that the court may look to other considerations beyond
those listed in determining whether a home environment is morally
unstable; however, establishing anyone of the listed sub-criteria
necessarily constitutes sufficient proof. l64
Judge Barnes argued that even if some degree of ambiguity
were conceded, a process of basic statutory construction would still
lead to the conclusion that the legislature meant for serial illegitimacy to be sufficient grounds for finding neglect under Section
52(f)}65 He observed that the duty of the court when considering a
statute is to carry out the clear legislative intent}66 If a statute is
"ambiguous, the courts should consider the evils or mischief which
the Legislature sought to remedy and should construe the language
so as to effectuate the general purposes and policies of the legislation."167 Judge Barnes noted that there was no difficulty determining what the legislature wished to do when it adopted Section
160. See id. at 488, 248 A.2d at 396.
161. See id.
162. See generally id. at 488-91, 248 A.2d at 393-95 (discussing statutory ambiguity
and legislative intent).
163. Id. at 489, 248 A.2d at 393.
164. See id. at 489, 248 A.2d at 393-94.
165. See id. at 490, 248 A.2d at 394.
166. See id. at 489, 248 A.2d at 394 (quoting Maryland Med. Serv., Inc. v. Carver,
238 Md. 466, 477-78, 209 A.2d 582, 588 (1965) ("The cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to discover and to carry out the real legislative intention.") ).
167. Id. at 490, 248 A.2d at 394 (citing Cooley v. White Cross Health and Beauty
Aid Discount Ctrs., Inc., 229 Md. 343, 350, 183 A.2d 381, 385-86 (1962».
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52(f) (6) 168 because the statute was an outgrowth of the work done
by the "excellent Commission to Study Problems of Illegitimacy. "169
The following consideration of the Commission's work, and its recommendations which provided the basis for Article 26, Section
52(f), demonstrates with even greater certainty that the purpose of
Section 52(f) was, without any ambiguity whatsoever, to perform the
function that was essentially denied by the Cager majority.
IV. THE REPORT OF THE
PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY

COMMISSION

TO

STUDY

The Commission cited in its final Report (the Report) two propositions as the foundation of its inquiry: "1. That illegitimacy is, in
itself, a social problem for the entire community; and 2. That illegitimacy among recipients of Aid to Dependent Children creates special problems of grave concern." 170 The Report further declared
that
Illegitimacy now presents a growing . . . problem to the
community[,] ... the 'home without a family.' Such homes
have no fathers in the social sense, the illegitimate children
residing with their mothers. This creates a form of 'family
life' which is in conflict with all accepted standards of child
welfare. These female centered families may consist of
mother, daughters, other female relatives-all with illegitimate children, fathered by a series of non-resident males. l7l
The Commission opined that "American Society is based on the
family as the basic unit of the social order through which husband
and wife by their coordinated industry and self-sacrifice, provide for
the religious, moral, social, emotional and economic needs of their
growing children." 172
There is a strong resemblance between the Commission's comments and observations concerning welfare and illegitimacy as it was
waged twenty-five years ago and today's debate. For example, the
Commission noted that "[r] eported increases in the extent to which
illegitimacy appears in the Aid to Dependent Children program,
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 489, 248 A.2d at 393-94.
[d. at 490, 248 A.2d at 394.
COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 12.
[d. at 13.
[d. (quoting GoVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
REpORT 17 (1960).
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have caused an aroused public to demand ... action,"173 and that
"[i] t is strongly suspected by many that ... Aid to Dependent Children ... actually encourages illegitimacy .... "174
The Commission further observed that" [c]ritics of the [AFDC]
program, pointing to the original objective of 'strengthening family
life,' cite the reported increase in the number of second and third
generation families with illegitimate children that have been receiving assistance over the past twenty-five years as indicative of the program's failure."175 Furthermore, the Commission noted that these
critics are increasingly of the opinion that "[AFDC] is merely a dole
which continues undesirable conditions."176 The Report suggested
that "[ t] he community's failure to . . . have confidence in the
[AFDC] program is evidenced by its increasing unwillingness to support it without assurance of efforts to correct the problem."177
The core of the Commission's Report consisted of nineteen
recommendations set out in chapter 3,178 each accompanied by a
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. The Commission also noted widespread doubts concerning both the competence and intentions of those administering the program: "The question is
often raised as to whether [those] in executive positions possess sufficient
background in management and personnel administration to handle such
enormous amounts of money, and whether a majority of case workers are
knowledgeable enough to control the distribution of money in the public's
best interest." Id.
178. See id. at 22-38. Recommendation One proposed new procedures for establishing paternity and determining custody and guardianship, recommended that
the bastardy law be repealed, and that § 38 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution be amended to allow delinquencies in child support payments of
both legitimate and illegitimate children as exceptions from the prohibition
against imprisonment for debt; Recommendation Two proposed what would
become the five sulxriteria to MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) (6) (1966) (repealed 1969), concerning the determination of an unstable moral environment; Recommendation Three advised against passing legislation that would
either recognize common law marriage or punish "illicit cohabitation"; Recommendation Four advised against legalizing abortion or sterilization as methods of addressing illegitimacy; Recommendation Five suggested that Congress
be asked to consider whether children should be permitted to receive AFDC
benefits through a man who has either acknowledged paternity or who has
been declared a needy child's natural father in a court proceeding; Recommendation Six recommended that the Legislative Council investigate the desirability of permitting marriage by civil ceremony in Maryland; Recommendation Seven proposed that Maryland's legislation implementing the state AFDC
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discussion of the Committee's underlying rationale and expectations. Recommendations Two and Seven are of particular significance to the holding in Gager and the dissent, because they were
the source of the substance of Section 52(£).179
Recommendation Two proposed that the definition of a "neglected child" be revised and "broadened to provide that a child
whether legitimate or illegitimate is neglected if living in a home
which fails to provide a stable moral environment; and to further
provide that the absence of such stable moral environment is prima
facie established" if any of the five criteria are met. lso The list of criteria suggested by the Commission to establish such prima facie evidence consisted almost verbatim of the sub-criteria that were codified as Section 52(£) (6) (i)_(V).ISI
program be revised to state that the overreaching goal of the program is to
"strengthen family life" (this language is identical to that used in the AFDC
statute, see supra note 133), and that suitable home and neglect standards be
revised in a manner that was soon realized as MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f)
(1966) (repealed 1969); Recommendation Eight proposed creation of a statewide coordinated network of social work services for illegitimately pregnant
women; Recommendation Nine proposed creation of a Division of Child Welfare and several related recommendations; Recommendation Ten suggested
measures to facilitate a continuing state responsibility for the prevention and
control of illegitimacy; Recommendation Eleven suggested implementation of
a permanent illegitimacy reporting capacity; Recommendation Twelve suggested the appointment of a committee to inquire into personnel administration policies of the Department of Public Welfare; Recommendation Thirteen
proposed that the Governor appoint a committee to study the matter of religious and moral education in the public schools of Maryland; Recommendation Fourteen recommended authorization for state entities to refer clients or
patients for family planning services and counseling; Recommendation Fifteen
recommended that the procedures and requirements relating to the issuance
of birth certificates be revised in various ways to assist establishing a means for
tracking paternity or illegitimacy; Recommendations Sixteen through
Nineteen concerned various proposals for the gathering and sharing of information and related coordination among different state agencies with regard
to illegitimacy and implementation of a continuous administrative capacity to
monitor and control it. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 22-38.
179. See generally COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 24-25, 27-28.
180. Id. at 24.
181. See id. The full text of Recommendation Two provides:
[T]he absence of [a] stable moral environment is prima facie estalr
lished if the parent, guardian or person with whom the child lives:
(1) Is unable to provide such environment by reasons of immaturity, emotional, mental or physical disability,
(2) Is engaging in promiscuous conduct inside or outside the
home,
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In Recommendation Seven, the Commission suggested that Maryland's Aid to Dependent Children Law l82 be subject to three
amendments. 183 First, the Commission recommended that a statement of policy be incorporated into the law declaring that the program's primary purpose is to strengthen family life and to assist
qualified families toward maximum independence within a certain
time frame and in homes suitable for children. l84 Second, the Commission recommended that the suitable home clause of the state's
ADC law be amended to provide that assistance will not be given if
there is reasonable cause to believe that a child in the home is neglected, with exceptions to allow for remedial actions. 18S Third, the

182.
183.
184.

185.

(3) Is co-habiting with a person to whom he or she is not
married,
(4) Is pregnant with an illegitimate child, or
(5) Has, within a period of twelve months preceding the filing
of the petition alleging neglect, either been pregnant with or
given birth to an illegitimate child in addition to the child
whose neglect is complained of.
Id.; cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) (6) (i)-(v) (1966) (repealed 1969). See generaUy supra note 21 (providing full text of § 52(f).
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 48A (1966).
See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 27-28.
See ill. at 27.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 48A (1966). The provision then in force read as
follows:
[A]ssistance shall be given to any dependent child who:
(a) Has resided in this State for one year immediately preceding the application for such assistance; or who was born within
one year immediately preceding the application, if the parent
or relative with whom the child is living has resided in this
State for one year immediately preceding the date of application; or whose parent has resided in this State for one year immediately preceding the date of application; provided, however, that the State Department is authorized and empowered
to make reciprocal arrangements with other states to waive residence requirements when, in their judgement, the same are
deemed necessary, so long as the waiver does not invalidate
federal matching, the foregoing State residence requirement
shall be considered abrogated and rendered null and void simultaneously with the effective date of such federal enactment.
(b) Is living in a family home meeting the standards of care
and health, fixed by the laws of this State and any rules and
regulations adopted pursuant thereto, and in which home the
child's particular religious faith should· be fostered and protected, if possible.
Id.
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Commission recommended that the welfare department of each political subdivision in Maryland be charged with alerting those on assistance of reasons why assistance may be suspended, to impose a
thirty-day time limit for corrective action, and to file a petition alleging neglect and seeking action on the child's behalf when circumstances· require. 186
The comment accompanying Recommendation Seven is particularly enlightening. It stated that the neglect to which Recommendation Seven refers would include the type of neglect described in
Recommendation Two-"failure to provide a child with a stable
moral environment."187 The Commission further stated:
[T] he recommended legislation would not deprive any
needy child of support because of the unacceptable conduct of the mother or other person having its care. It
would provide the welfare departments with an opportunity
to help the person through aggressive casework to either
correct the undesirable conditions in the home or place the
child in an acceptable [home]. . . . The Commission believes
that laws relating to [AFDC] should provide for the child's
moral environment as well as ... physical needs, and that
neglect not corrected within a thirty-day period should be
referred to the court and changes effected under its direction. Under the recommended legislation the child is assured
of continued SUpport. 188
On the question of statutory construction, Judge Barnes noted that
the original draft of the bill, which became Article 26, Section
52 (f) ,189 provided the phrase "the absence of such stable moral environment is prima facie established if"190 followed by the language at
Section 52(f) (6) (i)-(v).191 By amendment, these words were later replaced with the phrase" [i]n determining whether such stable moral
environment exists, the court shall consider, among other things
. . . . "192 Judge Barnes observed this change indicated that the legislature, while intending mandatory consideration of the listed criteSee COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 27-28.
Id. at 28.
Id. (emphasis added).
See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473,494,248 A.2d 384, 397 (1968) (Barnes,]., dissenting).
190. COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 24 (Recommendation Two).
191. See supra note 21 (providing full text of § 52(f).
192. eager, 251 Md. at 495, 248 A.2d at 397 (Barnes,]., dissenting).
186.
187.
188.
189.

1997]

Problems of IDegitimacy

157

ria, wished to specify that they need not be exclusive considerations. 193 The legislature intended to broaden the court's discretion
in assessing whether an environment is neglectful, not to erect obstacles to the court's ability to make such a determination. 194 Generally, Judge Barnes observed that bearing multiple illegitimate children while on public assistance has been deemed to be inherently
neglectful, and removing children from such an environment was in
keeping with other court decisions and child welfare statutes at that
time. 195 Finally, the dissent observed that there was no attempt by
the plaintiffs to present any actual evidence that the children were
not living in neglectful circumstances. 196 "The failure to produce
any such evidence," Judge Barnes stated, "indicates strongly to me
that no such evidence was available. "197

v.

THE CONTEXT OF IN RE GAGER

The actions by Prince George's County authorities in Cager did
not deprive the children of care and support, even as defined
under King. The work of the Commission and the legislative history
of Article 26, Section 52(f), combined with the history and statutory
language of AFDC, amply demonstrate that the State's actions were
not only justifiable administrative undertakings within the context
of AFDC, but were essential to Maryland's ability to fulfill its obligations under the program.
The court's construction of the neglected child statute was not
only contrary to the statute's plain meaning and legislative history,
but also boldly illogical. However, the Cager court seems to have
been more concerned with the matters of the AFDC supported children than with the children themselves. It was the mothers' predicament, not the children's, that seems to have been the true object of
the court's solicitousness. Because AFDC is specifically for children,
however, supporting adults only to the extent that doing so is
deemed in the interests of children,198 the court was forced to fash193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 500.01, 248 A.2d at 399-400 (citing In re Dake, 180 N.E.2d 646, 648
(Ohio Misc. 1961) (" [I]s a woman who is incapable of ordering her own life
in accordance with the prevailing legal and moral codes, incapable of raising
children without a father?"»; see also id. at 501, 248 A.2d at 400 (citing In re
Turner, 231 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio Misc. 1967».
196. See id. at 499, 248 A.2d at 399.
197. Id.
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) ("For the purpose of encouraging ... each State to
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ion a decoy of reasoning focused' on the children III order to defend the mothers.
Assuming this inference is correct, the picture changes dramatically. If protecting a mother's status under the program, and shielding her from the moral censure inherent in Section 52(f) is understood to have been the court's true objective, the opinion
undergoes a metamorphosis: a dense and poorly reasoned opinion,
utterly blind to obvious and essential distinctions and entirely inconsistent with logic, precedent, and legislative history, becomes a subtle maneuver by the court to impose a preferred policy result. Of
course, such a motive is unprovable in the strict sense. Nonetheless,
the prevailing jurisprudence and academic thinking at the time of
Gager underscores the court's true motive.
In its early years, the AFDC program was tightly budgeted and
highly moralistic. l99 The administrative policy was deeply concerned
with individualized management and was characterized by a distinct
emphasis on personal character, including sexual morality and the
general conviction that failure in that regard was a primary factor in
the onset and perpetuation of dependency.200 Moreover, state administration of AFDC programs was often racially biased. 201 The
Flemming Ruling, on the other hand,202 was symptomatic of an
emerging perspective toward welfare recipients and the proper administration of welfare programs that was far less inclined to attribute reliance on transfer payments as evidence of either poor character or even personal misfortune. 203 Instead, this new perspective
viewed poverty as a symptom of larger structural inequalities inherent in the social framework and inextricable from larger economic
and racial inequity.204 Poverty bore only a secondary relation to the
specific character and conduct of individuals receiving public
assistance. 205
Several United States Supreme Court decisions, and administrative rule changes have reinforced this new way of thinking. For example, between 1961 and 1974 AFDC rule changes decreased eligi-

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

furnish financial assistance ... to needy dependent children and the parents
or relatives with whom they are living.").
See BELL, supra note 15, at 111-23; see also Lurie, supra note 138, at 838.
See BELL, supra note 15, at 111-23.
See id. at 175, 181-86.
See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
See generaUy MURRAY, supra note 18, at 2440.
See generaUy id.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 14.
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bility requirements,206 imposed mandatory annual increases in
benefit levels,207 and increased benefit levels in absolute terms. 20S A
breadwinner's unemployment became sufficient grounds for AFDC
eligibility; this is a fundamental break from past rationale that the
program was exclusively for those actually incapable of selfsupport. 209 Administrative changes in allowable levels of income also
greatly increased the number of persons eligible to receive AFDC.210
During the same time AFDC eligibility requirements were liberalized, state authorities were given only limited discretion to monitor home conditions or to count the assets of unmarried adult
males residing in the home toward figuring eligibility and benefit
levels. 211 The Supreme Court even discerned a constitutional right
to travel from state to state without experiencing disturbance to
one's eligibility on account of varying state eligibility rules.212 Overall, there was a rush to extirpate from public policy in general, and
the administration of AFDC by the states in particular, what had
from the inception been the standard approach of moral censure
and suspicion concerning conduct and character among AFDC
recipients. 213

VI. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE IN RE GAGER AND THE COMMISSION ON ILLEGITIMACY
Whatever the actual causal relationship is between welfare programs and the growth in the illegitimacy rate, an examination of
trends between out-of-wedlock childbearing and divorce strongly
suggests that the phenomenal growth in illegitimacy among some
sectors of the population since the mid-1960s is the result of larger
social trends during that same time period and not unique to those
receiving public assistance. For instance, between 1960 and 1993 the
proportion of illegitimate births increased dramatically across the
206. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970) (requiring that the first $30.00 plus onethird of income be disregarded toward determining AFDC eligibility).
207. See Engelman v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23, 24 (1971) (per curiam) (requiring that the
$30.00 and one-third disregard be applied to any exclusions in state ceilings
on gross income for AFDC eligibility).
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See, e.g., Lurie, supra note 138, at 836-37.
211. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) (invalidating MARS regulations).
212. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Specifically, the court held that
residency requirements for AFDC eligibility violated the constitutional right to
travel because the restraint fell exclusively on the poor. See id. at 630.
213. See supra notes 192-94.
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entire population from approximately six percent of all births in
1960 to more than thirty percent in 1993.214 Although this trend began prior to the 1960s, the increase in the number of illegitimate
births between 1960 and 1980, as opposed to 1940 to 1960, was dramatic. 2lS The growth in the number of illegitimate births is also
partly attributable to a relational increase. The birth rate per 1,000
for all unmarried women ages fifteen to forty-four increased from
14.1 in 1950, to 26.4 in 1970, to 28.4 in 1980, and to 45.3 in 1993.216
During the same time frame, the birth rate per 1,000 married women of the same age decreased substantially from 410.4 in 1950, to
443.7 in 1970, to 350.0 in 1980, and to 388.0 in 1993.217
These trends in the United States were similar to other industrialized countries at the time excluding Asian countries. In fact,
since 1970, Sweden and Denmark have experienced far greater increases in rates of out-of-wedlock childbearing than has the United
States. 218 Not surprisingly, these trends have been accompanied by a
dramatic increase in the rate of divorce during the same time
frame. Although the number of divorces per 1,000 married women
actually fell between 1950 and 1960, from approximately ten to
eight divorces per 1,000 married women, subsequent to this time
period the rate began a steady increase. 219 The divorce rate per
1,000 married women was approximately fourteen in 1970 and
twenty-three in 1980. 220 Since 1980, however, the rate has fallen
slightly to approximately twenty-one per 1,000 married women. 221
214. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 143. I have attempted to extract from
graph form those numbers relevant to the time frame between the present
and the time of the Cager decision. Figures describing a broader time frame
reveal that between 1940 and 1993, the ratio of illegitimate to legitimate births
increased from 38 per 1,000 births to 310 per 1,000 births. These figures illustrate an increase from less than 4% to more than 30%. See supra note 143.
215. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 9 (noting that in 1980, the proportion was approximately 20%).
216. See id. at 88 tbl.I-2.
217. See id. at 118 tbI.III-7.
218. As of 1992, half of all births in Sweden were to unmarried women; in Denmark, 46% of all births were to unmarried women. See id. at 67. The United
Kingdom and the United States were nearly identical in this respect, reporting
31 % and 30% of all births to unmarried women, respectively. See id. France
also reported 31 % of births out of wedlock. See id. Percentages for illegitimate
childbearing for other industrialized nations were as follows: Canada 27%;
Germany 15%; The Netherlands 13%; Italy 7%; and Japan 1%. See id.
219. See id. at 26.
220. See id.
221. See id.
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This decrease in the divorce rate between 1980 and 1993 may be a
function of an overall dramatic decrease in marriage rates during
this period. Between 1955 and 1993, the percentage of married men
aged twenty to twenty-four years old fell from fIfty-one to eighteen
percent, and the percentage of married men aged twenty-fIve to
twenty-nine fell from seventy to forty-six percent. 222 In those same
years, the percentage of married women aged twenty to twenty-four
fell from sixty-nine to thirty-two percent, and the percentage of married women aged twenty-fIve to twenty-nine fell from eighty-six to
fIfty-nine percent. 223
At the time of Gager, broad societal change was underway in
which illegitimacy among the poor and welfare populations proved
to be an exacerbated exception. 224 Poverty, as well as the overall
growth in AFDC participation since the 1960s, cannot be attributed
to economic factors. The rate of illegitimate births and the proportion of the population receiving AFDC began to increase dramatically beginning in the 1960s and continued throughout the 1980s
regardless of economic growth, without any apparent connection to
larger economic trends. 225
222. See id. at 25.
223. See id. (providing the percentages of unmarried individuals).
224. See generaUy MURRAY, supra note 18, at 128, 130. Graphs illustrate that for all income levels illegitimate childbearing and single female households markedly
increased from 1960 to 1980-the poorer the group, the more rapid the increase. Income status is a profound correlate to illegitimacy. Although race is
a factor, it is much less correlative than income. See id. For a discussion of the
way in which cultural and entitlement inducements to illegitimacy delivered a
much greater impact among the poorer segments of the population, see id. at
154, 178.
225. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION 22 (1986). Speaking of his
experiences as an official in the Bureau of Labor Statistics during the Johnson
Administration, Moynihan stated:
[T] he number of new cases in postwar years rose and fell very much
as unemployment rose and fell .... [There was a] remarkably strong
correlation [] between unemployment and all manner of family dysfunction .... [A]s we moved from the late 1950s into the early 1960s
the correlations weakened and then quite disappeared. . . .
This came to be known as "the scissors." Plotted on a graph, the various rates would go up and down as if chained together, but then the
relation weakened, disappeared, and reappeared as its own opposite.
Without exception the indicators of social stress- separation, welfare-would now go up while the economic indicator-unemployment-would now go down. These patterns were to be found both
for whites and blacks, most strongly for blacks.
[d. at 22-23 (emphasis in original); see also MURRAY, supra note 18, at 58-68 (dis-
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As for Maryland, the Commission Report contained numerical
data concerning illegitimacy and various presumptively related factors226 for each political subdivision of the state. 227 At that time, apcussing and dismissing various economic explanations for the emergence of
categories of unemployment and welfare dependency beginning in the 1960s
which, for the first time, were unresponsive to larger economic factors).
226. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, apps. C & D at 131-65. Factors reported
include race, political subdivision, age of mother, number of siblings, place of
birth (in a hospital or not in a hospital), public assistance status, ages of siblings, and number of different fathers per household with more than one illegitimate child. See id.
227. See id. at 108-09 for a tabular breakdown of illegitimate children in the ADC
program for the 23 counties and Baltimore City, and the federal versus state
costs borne by government on behalf of illegitimate children. The percentage
of out of wedlock births comprised of all births in each political subdivision in
1961 was determined to be as follows:
Allegheny

2.24

Anne Arundel

5.04

Baltimore (County)
Calvert
Caroline

2.75
26.55
6.51

Carroll

1.00

Cecil

4.11

Charles

13.71

Dorchester

16.69

Frederick

8.00

Garrett

6.85

Harford

6.85

Howard

2.91

Kent

12.57

Montgomery

2.25

Prince George's

3.94

Queen Anne's
St. Mary's

12.62
6.30

Somerset

16.83

Talbot

23.27

Washington

5.56

Wicomico

15.81

Worcestor

24.88

Baltimore City

17.55
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proximately 8.9% of all births in Maryland were illegitimate. 228
Among recipients of AFDC, the percentage of illegitimate births was
approximately 34.1 %,229 nearly four times as frequent.
It is not possible with today's data to precisely update the numerical data assembled by the Commission. Nor is it clear that it
would be interesting to do so because the data substantially consists
of breakdowns by each county and Baltimore City by race and other
factors. 23o If the principle driving force of increasing illegitimacy in
the United States has been larger cultural changes throughout the
industrialized world, then the important correlations to illegitimacy
are not municipal or racial, rather they are cultural, historical, and
behavioral. Nonetheless, the illegitimacy rate for Baltimore City at
the time of the Commission's Report was 17.5%.23\ In 1980, the illeId. at 132 tbl.I.
228. The (projected) totals were as follows:
> 74,610 births in 1961
> 67,665 legitimate
> 6,665 illegitimate
COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 61-62, 132.
These numbers were projected on the basis of actual data generated by
the Committee concerning January and February of 1961. See id. Projections
were based on an investigation of records over the preceding five years, which
revealed that January and February births during that period represented on
average 15.66% of annual births in Maryland. The actual totals for January
and February of 1961, which formed the basis for these projections, were:
> 11,658 births
> 10,617 legitimate
> 1,041 illegitimate
Id. at 62, 136.
Maryland birth records ceased to separately list illegitimacy as a reported
attribute of newborns in 1938. See id. at 61. Data for January and February was
specifically (and, one imagines, painstakingly) assembled by the staff of the
Commission in conjunction with the State Department of Health and the Baltimore City Department of Health. See id. at 61. The criteria used to deter. mine illegitimacy were as follows: differing last name of father and mother;
last name of child differing from last name of either the mother or father; the
absence of a father's name altogether; and a mother listing herself as a "Miss"
in themailingaddressshewasrequiredtoinscribeonthecertificate.Seeid.at
62.
229. See id. at 106-07. These statistics are as of December, 1958. This information
was derived from unpublished research assembled by the State Department of
Public Welfare prior to the formation of the Commission. See id. at 60.
Z30. The report acknowledged two races-"White" and "non-White"- and applied
these designations to virtually every other statistical category. See id. at 143,
148, 154-55, 163-65.
231. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 132.
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gitimacy rate for Baltimore City was 56.5%,232 and in 1992 the rate
was 60.8%.233 For Maryland as a whole, the illegitimacy rate was
8.9% in 1961,234 25.1 % in 1980,235 and 32.4% in 1993. 236
The potential significance of this dramatic increase in overall illegitimacy, locally, nationally, and throughout much of the industrialized world, can be gleaned from the growing body of research
that strongly points to severe long-term behavioral and psycho-social
consequences for children growing up in single parent families, particularly those families headed by women who never have married.237 As one commentator stated:
From the wild Irish slums of the nineteenth century eastern
seaboard, to the riot-torn suburbs of Los Angeles, there is
one unmistakable lesson in American History:' a community
that allows a large number of young men to grow up in
broken families, dominated by women, never acquiring any
stable relationship to male authority, never acquiring any
rational set of expectations about the future-that community asks for and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, disorder-most particularly the furious, unrestrained lashing out
at the whole social structure-that is not only to be expected; it is very near to inevitable. And it is richly
232. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 106 tbl.I1-6 (22.9% among whites;
74.2% among blacks).
233. See id. Regarding racial breakdown, the 1992 numbers were 29.1 % for whites
and 74.1 % for blacks. See id.
234. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 132. This figure was derived based on
the number of anticipated illegitimate births divided by the number of anticipated total births.
235. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 104 tbl.I1-5. The figures were as
follows: 11.4% among whites; 58.6% among blacks. See id.
236. See id. Regarding racial breakdown, the 1993 numbers were 17.9% for whites
and 61.9% for blacks. See id.
237. According to a study by the Progressive Policy Institute, "[the] relationship between crime and one parent families [is] so strong that controlling for family
configuration erases the relationship between race and crime and between low
income and crime." ELAINE CIUlLA KAMARCK & WILLIAM A GALSTON. PUTTING
CHILDREN FIRST: A PROGRESSIVE FAMILY POUCY FOR THE 1990s 14 (Sept. 1990);
see also JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN. CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE
246-53 (1985). Additional research has revealed a profound correlation between fatherlessness and maladjustments such as poor school performance,
poor health, emotional disorders, and serious difficulties with personal relationships. See Deborah A. Dawson, Family Structure and Well-Being: Data from the
1988 National Health Interview Suroey on Child Health, 53]. MARRIAGE & FAM.
573, 573-84 (1991).
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deserved. 238
In light of subsequent developments, the conclusion is all but
inescapable that the so called "enlightened" new way of thinking
about welfare, illegitimacy, and the family that blossomed rather
suddenly around the time Gager was decided, seems not to have
been as enlightened or sophisticated as some confidently declared it
to be. 239
VII.

CONCLUSION

For purposes of this Comment, it is ultimately of secondary importance whether welfare programs have been a substantial driving
force behind the phenomenal growth in illegitimacy in the past few
generations. The paramount issue in this examination of Gager concerns the proper source of guiding authority on matters of hroad
social policy. Whether or not illegitimacy trends have been grossly
exacerbated by a well-intentioned but unwise welfare system, the
fact remains that the proper authority to address matters of child
welfare in general and prospectively, and to form social policies
which look to influence the future shape of society, resides with the
legislature. The courts, despite their authority to determine the best
interests of the child, and their broad discretion in that regard, are
still confined to exercising judicial authority. Under no circumstances can the reasonable and legitimate exercise of such authority
extend to redesigning welfare programs in clear contravention of
the intentions of the legislature, or substituting one set of assumptions and objectives with another. Regardless of what the direction
or driving force behind illegitimacy trends was when Gager was decided, the legislature had spoken on the. issue and devised a means
of remedying the condition of serial illegitimacy. Furthermore, Article 26, Section 52 (f) was grounded in an exhaustive and systematic
examination of illegitimacy carried out by a broad and diverse crosssection of society.240 Finally, nothing in statutory or decisional au238. MOYNIHAN, supra note 225, at 9.
239. As the majority stated in King, "[F] ederal public welfare policy now rests on a
basis considerably more sophisticated and enlightened than the 'worthyperson' concept of earlier times. State plans are now required to provide for a
rehabilitative program of improving and correcting unsuitable homes." King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 324-25 (1968). Sophisticated, enlightened rehabilitative
programs that proceed hand-in-hand with a 300% increase in rates of illegitimate childbearing and the virtual extinction of family structure among their
target population make a strong case for crude, unenlightened social policies.
240. See supra note 9.
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thority presented valid obstacles to the vigorous enforcement of Section 52(f).
The ultimate issue which emerges from an examination of
Gager is not whether the method of addressing illegitimacy provided
for in Section 52(f) was the best means of addressing that problem,
nor whether that approach had any merit at all. The decision of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Gager represented a direct assault
on the proper separation of powers. As such, the opinion constituted an affront to representative government itself. Those inclined
to forgive such overreaching on grounds that the ends realized justifY the means used can find no basis for such a defense of Gager in
the social developments in Maryland which followed that decision.
Kevin Kendrick

